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Noting that the literature has focused on the link between the level of public expendi­
ture  and  growth,  we  derive  conditions  under  which  a  change  in  the  composition  of 
expenditure leads  to  a higher steady-state growth rate of the economy. The  conditions 
depend  not  just  on  the  physical  productivity  of  the  different  components  of  public 
expenditure but also on the initial shares. Using data from 43 developing countries over 
20  years we  show that an  increase in the share of current expenditure  has positive  and 
statistically significant growth effects. By contrast, the  relationship between the  capital 
component of  public  expenditure  and  per-capita  growth  is  negative.  Thus,  seemingly 
productive expenditures, when used in excess, could become unproductive. These results 
imply that developing-country governments have been misallocating public expenditures 
in  favor of capital expenditures at the expense of  current expenditures. 
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1.  Introduction 
Governments in developing countries spend an average of 26 percent of GOP 
on goods and services, a figure which has risen by eight percentage points over 
the last fifteen years (World Bank, 1992).  The magnitude and growth of this 
figure has prompted a fair amount of research on the relationship between the 
size  of  government  and  economic  growth  (for  a  survey,  see  Lindauer  and 
Velenchik, 1992).  Much less is known about how the composition of public 
expenditure affects a country's growth rate. Yet, this may be the central ques­
tion. First, while the size of government is a public-choice issue, its composition 
is open to policy discussion. Several observers distinguish between 'productive' 
and 'unproductive' public expenditures, and show how a country can improve 
its economic performance by changing the mix between the two. Second, after 
a decade of fiscal adjustment, during which many of the  'white elephants' in 
government budgets were weeded out, some developing countries are faced with 
hard choices when undertaking further fiscal restraint. Which component of 
public expenditure should be cut? Health? Education? Infrastructure? Defense? 
The answer must depend on, inter alia, the contribution of these components to 
economic growth. 
The purpose of  this paper is  to shed light on  the relationship between the 
composition of public expenditure and economic growth. Before proceeding, we 
note that governments undertake expenditures to pursue a variety of goals, only 
one  of which  may  be an increase  in per-capita income.  We focus  on  growth 
because (i) inasmuch as growth is one of the objectives of a government, it is useful 
to know the contribution of different components of expenditure to this objective 
as a means of assessing the cost of pursuing other goals, and (ii)  per-capita income 
is easier to measure than some of the other objectives of government. 
Neither economic theory nor empirical evidence provides clear-cut answers to 
the question of how  the composition of public expenditure affects economic 
growth. The theory develops a rationale for government provision of goods and 
services based on the failure of markets to provide public goods, internalize 
externalities, and  cover costs when there are significant economies of  scale. 
Furthermore, when there is a failure in one market, government intervention in 
a related market can be justified. Sound as they are, these theoretical notions do 
not translate easily into operational rules about which component of public 
expenditure is to be cut. 
On the empirical front, a few researchers have tried linking particular compo­
nents of government expenditure to private-sector productivity and economic 
growth  but  most  of  these  efforts  lack  a  rigorous  theoretical  framework 
(Diamond, 1989). The recent revival of interest in the expenditure-composition 
issue (Aschauer, 1989;  Morrison and Schwartz, 1991; Holtz-Eakin, 1991) has 
been based on theoretical models but the focus has been on the productivity of 
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In this paper, we develop in Section 2 an analytical framework which links the 
composition of public  expenditure  with  economic  growth.  In Section  3  we 
attempt to determine which components of  public expenditure - current or 
capital on the one hand, and health, education, transport and communications, 
or  defense on the  other - have been shown to be  productive in developing 
countries. Our major finding is that developing-country governments have been 
misallocating public expenditures in favor of capital expenditures at the expense 
of current expenditures. In Section 4 we provide an interpretation of our results. 
Section 5 presents our concluding remarks. 
2.  The model 
Since the 1960's, researchers have been looking at the relationship between 
fiscal policy and the economy's growth rate. The seminal contribution was by 
Arrow and Kurz (1970), who developed a model where consumers derive utility 
from private consumption as well as the public capital stock. In addition, private 
production benefits from the services of this capital stock.  Arrow and Kurz 
assumed (implicitly) that all government investment was productive. Further­
more, their model was in the neoclassical tradition where public spending only 
affected the economy's transitional growth rate; the steady-state growth rate 
remained unaltered. 
The recent explosion of work on endogenous growth has generated a number 
of models linking public spending with the economy's long-term growth rate. 
A particularly simple version is Barra's (  1990), which takes government expendi­
ture to be complementary with private production. Like Arrow and Kurz, Barro 
assumes that all government spending is productive in this sense. 
Meanwhile, the empirical literature on the same topic has highlighted the 
distinction between productive and unproductive government spending (e.g., 
Landau, 1983;  Aschauer,  1989;  Barro, 1990, 1991).  A major finding of these 
studies is that output growth is negatively correlated with the share of govern­
ment consumption in GDP. Aschauer and Barra also find a positive relation­
ship between public investment and output growth. 
We combine the above  empirical observation with  the  earlier  theoretical 
framework by postulating a model in which there are two types of government 
expenditure, productive and unproductive. The model expresses the difference 
between productive and unproductive expenditures by how a shift in the mix 
between the two alters the economy's long-term growth rate. We assume the 
aggregate production function has three arguments:1 private capital stock,  k, 
1 As is typical of these models, we leave out labor as a separate argument in the production function. 
If the economy in question has surplus labor, then labor is not a binding constraint and can be left 
out of the production function. Alternatively, we can consider the capital factor, k, to reflect human 
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and two types of government spending, g1 and g2. After developing the model, 
we will define precisely what it means for, say, g1 to be productive and g2 to be 
unproductive. If the functional form is CES (constant elasticity of substitution), 
then the relationship can be expressed as 
where 
r:t.  > 0,  f3 � 0,  "! � 0,  r:t.  + f3 + y  = 1' 
( �  - 1. 
(1) 
Following Barro (1990) , we assume that the government finances its expendi­
ture by levying a flat-rate income tax,2 r, 
(2) 
The share,¢ (0 ::::; ¢ ::::; 1), of total government expenditure which goes toward g1 
is given by 
gl  =  c/Jry  and  g2  = (1 -¢)ry.  (3) 
Taking the government's decisions on ra nd¢ as given,  3 the representative agent 
chooses consumption, c, and capital, k, to maximize his welfare 
U  = f:'  u(c)e  � '" dt,  (4) 
subject to 
k  =  (1 - r) y - c,  (5) 
where p is the rate of time preference. 
In order to get analytical solutions, it is useful to specialize the utility function 
to the isoelastic form: 
(6) 
20ur  focus  is  on  the  composition  of  expenditure,  we  abstract  from  issues  of the  financing  of 
government  expenditures:  (a)  There  is  no  deficit  financing in  the  model  as  the  government  is 
constrained to run a balanced budget (for a lucid treatment of the deficit financing issue, see Easterly, 
1989); and (b) the role of the structure  of taxes  is  not analyzed in examining the effect  of total 
government expenditure on per-capita growth (for a discussion of role of the structure of taxes in 
explaining growth variations, see Easterly and Rebelo, 1993, who experimented with 13 different tax 
measures and found only one variable� the marginal income tax rate� to be statistically significant). 
3While we do not analyze the government's decision problem of choosing expenditure or the tax 
rate, we are implicitly assuming that the government chooses the tax rate (r). Since the government is 
constrained  to  run  a  balanced  budget  in  the  model,  this  effectively  means  that  the  level  of 
government expenditure, g, is determined by default. Doing a complete analysis of the choice of both 
g and r would be a useful extension to our analysis. See Davoodi, Xie, and Zou (1995)  for an attempt. S. Devarajan et at. j Journal of Monetary Economics 37 (/996) 313-344  317 
Substituting (6) into (4) and maximizing subject to (1), (2), (3), and (5) yields the 
equation for the growth rate of consumption: 
c  a(l-r){rt + (g/k)-\[/34>-( + y(1- ¢)-(]} -(l+Ws- p 
c  (J 
(7) 
Call the steady-state growth rate of consumption /., and assume that along the 
steady-state growth path the tax rater (and hence gjy) is constant It follows that 
gjk is a constant which, by simple manipulation of (1)-(3), is given by 
(8) 
Substituting the value of gjk from (8) into (7) we obtain the steady-state growth 
rate of consumption as 
.  et(1- r){cn'/[r'-�¢-s-y(1- ¢)-']} -(1 +W\- p 
�=  . 
(J 
(9) 
From Eq. (9), we can derive a relationship between the steady-state growth rate, 
)., and the share of government expenditure devoted to g1: 
dl.  a(1- r)(1 + 0  [ar'r(l+Ofs[�¢-o +o- y(1- ¢)-(1 +;J 
d¢  a[rl:- �¢  \-;;(l -¢)  'J  11\  (10) 
We can now define productive expenditure: that component of public expendi­
ture an increase in whose share will raise the steady-state growth rate of the 
economy. From Eq. (10), the component g1  is productive if dA.jd¢ > 0. 
What are the implications of this definition for the parameters of the model? 
Assuming ;  [given by  Eq. (9)]  is positive,  the right-hand side of (10) will be 
positive if 
(1 + ()[�¢-(1+()- y(1- ¢)-(!+\)]  > 0.  (  11) 





<  y' 
(12) 
where e  =  1/(1 + 0 is the elasticity of substitution. Note that the condition (12) 
-for a shift in the composition to increase the growth rate- depends not just on 
the productivity (/3 and }') of the two components but also on the initial shares. 
Thus, a shift in favor of an 'objectively' more productive type of expenditure (e.g., 
f3 > y) may not raise the growth rate if its initial share (¢) is 'too high'. 
4When (  = - 1, the production technology is linear, i.e., y = rtk + {Jg1 + (g2, and the growth rate of 
consumption is ?c  =  [(1- r)rt- p]ja. In such a case, the composition of government expenditure 
plays no role in enhancing the rate of economic growth.  This is intuitive, since if ( = - 1, the two 
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To  see  the  intuition  behind  this  condition,  consider  the  special  case  of 
Cobb-Douglas  technology,  for which  (  =  0  and 0  =  1. Then condition  (12) 
becomes 
¢  f3 
-- <- . 
1 -¢  y 
According to this condition, if the relative share of public expenditure devoted 
to the two goods g1 and g2 is below their relative output elasticities (/3 
and y are 
the output elasticities of g1 and g2, respectively), then a shift in the mix towards 
g1  will increase the economy's long-run growth rate.5 Both elasticities may be 
positive (i.e., both components of government expenditure are complementary 
with private production), yet if the above condition holds, transferring resources 
from  g2  to  g1  will  raise  the  steady-state  growth  rate.  Further,  f3 > y  is  not 
sufficient to guarantee that a shift in favor of g  1  will increase the growth rate; it 
must be the case that the relative budget shares are below the relative output 
elasticities. 
Now  consider  the  more  general  case  of a  CES  technology,  where  0 =/= 1. 
Assume f3 >  y and define ¢* as the critical value above which an increase in the 
share of expenditure going to g1  will not increase the growth rate. That is, 
How will the critical value of ¢* change as e increases? Simple manipulation 
reveals that 
- = (1 -¢*)  - In  - , 
d¢*  (/3)0  (/3)  dO  y  y 
so that d¢*  jdO > 0 since f3 >  y.  As the  two types of government expenditure 
become more and  more substitutable,  ¢* increases.  The intuition  is that the 
more substitutable are the two types of expenditure, the more likely it will be 
that an increase in  the share going to the one with the higher coefficient will 
increase the  growth  rate.  Conversely,  when  the substitution elasticity is low, 
increasing the amount going to g1  may not increase the growth rate even if the 
5 As pointed out by an anonymous referee,¢, the budgetary share, cannot be equal to either 0 or I in 
the Cobb- Douglas specification because one of the g's then is zero and so is output. Even the case 
where ¢ is close  to  0  or  I  is problematic because output then is arbitrarily small.  While this is 
a restrictive assumption (especially when there are more than two public goods) in the sense that 
there is no reason to believe that societies cannot set components of government expenditure at any 
proportions (including zero) they like, the Cobb-Douglas case simplifies the algebra and provides 
valuable insights into the model. Furthermore, as shown above, the model results hold for the more 
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initial  share  is  quite  small.  In  the limiting case,  when  0  =  0,  the production 
function is of the Leontief form and increasing g1's share over a certain amount 
will have no effect on the long-run growth rate. 
Note  that  the  increase  in  the  growth  rate  achieved  by  shifting  towards 
productive expenditure can be accomplished with no change in total govern­
ment expenditure. In fact, the effect of an increase in the latter on the growth rate 
is ambiguous. To see this, consider the response of}. to an increase in r (since 
r  = gjy, this is equivalent to an increase in the share of government expenditure 
in GDP). Some tedious manipulation reveals that 
dA.  r'+ 1 
dr 
2 (  < ) 0  if 
B 






B = f3rr' + ;(1 - ¢)-'. 
Clearly,  the relationship between  r  and A.  is ambiguous and can  change  sign 
depending  upon  the  relationship  between  r  and B,  where  the  latter  can  be 
thought  of  as  a  proxy  for  the  total  productivityof  government  expenditure. 
Some further intuition can be derived by considering the Cobb-Douglas tech­
nology, in which the above condition reduces to 
d). 
dr 
> 0  when  r  < f3 +  y, 
and conversely if T  > f3 + y. This is intuitive given our balanced-budget assump­
tion: an increase in total government spending, since it has to be financed by 
taxes,  will raise the steady-state growth rate only if the productivity of that 
government spending ([3 + y) exceeds the taxes required to pay for it. 
The model can be extended in several ways. We now consider three. First, the 
number of components of government expenditure can be increased from just 
two. This extension only makes the algebra more cumbersome without improv­
ing our knowledge of the growth process. If there are N types of government 
expenditure, each with  its  own exponent, f3i, in the production function,  and 
share rPi in the  budget,  then the  effect on  growth  of  increasing  the  share  of 
government expenditure going to the  ith component depends on  which  com­
ponent's share is being reduced. If the increase in i's share comes from a com­
ponent j such that 




then the shift in expenditure composition will increase the steady-state growth 
rate of the economy. Alternatively, if the above inequality were reversed, then 
a shift from j to i would lower the long-run growth rate. 
Second, not all components of government expenditure affect the production 
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consumer welfare. In our model, this can be incorporated by including these 
components in the consumer's utility function, and allowing their coefficient in 
the production function to be zero. The rest of the analysis follows as before. 
Finally, in this model, we take the government's decisions as given, rather 
than deriving them from some optimizing framework. Doing the latter requires 
specifying the government's objective function and the result will depend on this 
function. While we do not attempt such an exercise in this paper, our results 
- especially those  in  the next  section - suggest that this  may  be  a  fruitful 
extension. See Davoodi, Xie, and Zou  (1995) and Zhang and Zou (1 996) for 
some preliminary results. 
Despite its simplicity, the model described above yields an important insight 
into what makes particular components of government expenditure productive. 
In particular, it shows that the answer does not depend on the  sign of  the 
exponent in the production function; rather, it is a relationship between the 
coefficient (output elasticity in the Cobb-Douglas case) and the actual share in 
the budget which determines whether or not a component is productive. How­
ever, the formal framework begs the question of which government expenditures 
are productive and which are not. In the next section, we attempt to answer this 
question by examining empirically how the growth performance of developing 
countries over time was affected by the composition of their public expenditures. 
We ask the data to tell us which components of expenditure are productive. 
3.  Empirical analysis 
Our  empirical  analysis  focuses  on the  link  between  various  components 
of  government  expenditure  and  economic  growth  in  developing  countries. 
Aschauer  and  Greenwood  (1985),  Barro  (1990),  and  others  emphasize  the 
distinction between public goods and services that enter into the household's 
utility  function  and  those  that  complement private  sector  production.  The 
former, which they argue would include much of government consumption, are 
likely to have negative growth effects. While it provides utility to households, 
government consumption lowers economic growth because the higher taxes 
needed to finance the consumption expenditure reduce returns on investments 
and the incentive to invest. This is confirmed by Grier and Tullock (1 987). Using 
pooled cross-section/time-series data (115 countries including 24 OECD coun­
tries in the post-World War II period), they find a significantly negative relation­
ship between the growth rate of real GDP and government consumption's share 
of GDP. By contrast, government investment expenditure, such as the provision 
of infrastructure services, is thought to provide the enabling environment for 
growth.  Aschauer  (1989)  finds  that  'core  infrastructure'  - streets,  highways, 
airports, mass transit, and other  public capital - has the  most explanatory 
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1949-85. Based on a set of cross-country regressions, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
find that public investment in transport and communications in developing 
countries  leads  to  higher  economic  growth.  For  other  categories  of  public 
spending, there appears to be some disagreement over whether they consti­
tute 'productive' expenditure. While Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier and 
Tullock (1 987), and Summers and Heston (1988) classify defense and education 
as government consumption and hence unproductive, Barro (1991) models them 
as productive. He considers spending on public education as investing in human 
capital. Similarly, defense spending helps protect property rights which increases 
the probability that an investor will receive the marginal product of capital. 
Based on data on 98 countries, Barro (1 991) finds that an increase in resources 
devoted to nonproductive government consumption is associated with lower 
per-capita growth. 
In our analysis, we refrain from an a priori classification of public expendi­
tures into 'productive' and 'unproductive'. Instead, we allow the data to tell us 
which components conform to our definition of productive expenditure. Fur­
thermore, since ours is a pooled, cross-section/time-series data set, we are able to 
capture some of the lags involved in translating productive public expenditures 
into economic growth. Our study is also unique inasmuch as it focuses exclu­
sively on developing countries. Most of the other studies use a mixed sample of 
developed and developing countries, or examine developed countries only. As 
we will show, the results change dramatically when the sample is restricted to 
developing countries. 
3.1.  Data and choice  of variables 
The empirical analysis uses annual data on 43 countries (see Appendix B for 
the  list of  countries) from  1970 through 1990 to examine the link between 
components of government expenditure and economic growth. The pooled data 
include total central government expenditures (including current and capital), 
expenditures for defense, education, health, and transport and communication.6 
The latter expenditure variable is used as a proxy for expenditure in economic 
infrastructure. 
The model in Section 2 developed links between the shares of government 
expenditure and the long-term growth rate of the economy. In the empirical 
analysis, we test whether the share allocated to different components of govern­
ment expenditure is associated with higher growth. Thus, our key explanatory 
variable is the share of each component in total government expenditure. To 
control for level effects, we also include the share of government expenditure in 
6 As a check on our results, we repeat our analysis for the subsample of countries for which there are 
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GDP. This also allows us  to  control for the effects of financing government 
expenditure (which is a function of the level) on growth. Given that the pattern 
of economic growth has been uneven across the continents, we include continent 
dummies to control for the continent-specific effect. In addition, we attempt to 
control for two other factors which determine a country's growth rate but are 
not necessarily linked to the composition of public expenditure: external shocks 
and other domestic policies.  The  latter is  measured by the premium on the 
official rate in the black market for foreign exchange. Finally, the dependent 
variable  is  the  five-year  forward  moving  average  of  per-capita  real  GDP 
growth. 7  The forward lag is chosen to reflect the fact that public expenditures 
often take time before their effects on output growth can be registered. We use 
a  five-year  average to eliminate  short-term  fluctuations  induced  by  shifts  in 
public expenditure, and by choosing a moving average we are able to increase 
the number of time series observation in our panel data. 
The choice of a five-year forward lag structure is aimed at addressing another 
problem which plagues most analyses of the link between public expenditure 
and growth: the joint endogeneity of the two variables and the  possibility of 
reverse causality. For instance, if education expenditure is negatively associated 
with growth, it need not necessarily mean that education expenditure is un­
productive; it could mean that slow-growing countries spend more on education 
in an attempt to grow faster. While this problem exists in principle in our paper 
as well, we  attempt  to minimize it  by  modeling  expenditure  in  period  t  as 
affecting growth from period t + I through t + 5. Thus, for the reverse causality 
argument to hold in our model, governments would have to anticipate  the 
decline in growth rates up to five years into the future and accelerate education 
spending today.8 
3.2.  Regression analysis 
The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to estimate the following 
equation: 
5 
GRPCGDP;,+J.t-5)  =  I  rxjDj + rxdTE/GDP); + :x7BMPj 
j=l 
(13) 
7Whether the  five-year  average  is long enough  to  capture  the long-term  growth  is an  issue  of 
contention. In the econometric analysis we tried seven-year and ten-year averages but the results did 
not  change significantly. 
81f, however, the growth rate has a distributed lag structure, then the  joint endogeneity problem may 
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where the variables are: 
(i)  GRPCGDP;,+l.t+s>: Five-year forward moving average of per-capita real 
GOP growth for country i. 
(ii)  Di Continental dummy variables; j = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 correspond to East 
Asia, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Europe, Middle 
East, and North Africa (EMENA), respectively. 
(iii)  (TE/GDP);: Share of total government expenditure in GOP for country i at 
time t. 
(iv)  BMP;: Premium in  the black market for foreign exchange in  country i at 
time  t,  calculated  as  BMER; = [(BMER;- OER;)/OER;]*lOO,  where 
BMER; =black market exchange rate and OER; =official exchange rate. 
(v)  SHOCK;: The shock variable is a weighted average of changes in the world 
real interest rate (R) and the export price index (P  X) and import price index 
(PM) for each country.  The export and import price indices are index 
numbers expressed in U.S. dollars converted at the annual average of the 
country's official exchange rate. The weights  are the ratios to  GOP of 
debt, exports (X), and imports (M), respectively.  By 'changes' we  mean 
the difference in the average value of these variables between  t - 4 to t 
and  t +  1  to  t + 5.  In  symbols  it  is  defined  as,  SHOCK, = 
(R,+r.r+s- Rr-4.r)*(DEBT/GDP),- (PX,+t.r+s- PXt-4.1)*(X/GDP), 
+ PM,+t,r+s- PMr-4,r)*(M/GDP),. 
(vi)  (G/TE);: A vector of public expenditure ratios for country i at time t:9 
Expenditure shares by economic classification: Ncur/Te =ratio of current 
expenditure  (net  of  interest  payments)  to  total  expenditure  and 
Cap/T  e =  ratio of capital expenditure to total expenditure. 
Expenditure shares by functional classification: Def/Te =ratio of defense 
expenditure to total expenditure, Hlth/Te =  ratio of health expenditure to 
total expenditure [the subcategories of health expenditure include expendi­
ture on hospitals (Hasp), spending on clinics providing mainly outpatient 
9We use the classification of government expenditure used in  the International Monetary Fund's 
(IMF)  Government  Financial  Statistics.  The  IMF classification  follows  two  main  lines:  (I)  the 
economic classification of expenditure which is based on the type or economic characteristics of 
expenditure, and (2) the functional classification of expenditure which is based on the purpose or 
function toward which the expenditure is directed. The former is grouped in terms of the type of 
outlay: (a) Capital Expenditure which covers payments for the purchase or production of new or 
existing durable goods (i.e., goods with a life of  more than one year); and (b) Current or Recurrent 
Expenditure which in turn includes wages and salaries, other goods and services, interest payments, 
and subsidies. The latter includes expenditures on (a) economic services (transport and communica­
tion, electricity, agriculture, etc.), (b)  social  services (education, health, etc.), (c) general government 
services (general public administration, defense, public order and safety, etc.), and (d) other functions. 
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services (lnhlth), and other spending on health (Othlth)], Ed/Te =ratio of 
education expenditure to total expenditure [the subcategories of education 
expenditure include expenditure of spending on schools (Schl), spending 
on  universities  ( U niv),  and  other  spending  on  education  (  Othed)], 
Tac/Te =ratio  of  transportation  and  communication  expenditure  to 
total expenditure. 
(vii)  p;: Error term. 
By constructing the dependent variable as a five-year forward moving average of 
per capita real GDP growth we introduce serial correlation in the error terms 
within a country sample. The standard errors of the OLS estimator are therefore 
incorrect although estimates are consistent. To correct the standard errors we 
extend the method of correlation correction outlined by Hansen and Rodrick 
(1 980).10 
Table  1  contains the estimates of  Eq.  (13).  Eq. (1.1) shows a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the five-year forward moving aver­
age of  per-capita real  GDP growth and the ratio of current (net of interest 
spending)  to  total  expenditure.  A  unit  increase  in  this  ratio  increases  the 
per-capita real GDP growth rate by 0.05 percentage points. Clearly, this is an 
unusual finding. For example, Barro (1 990, 1991) finds that consumption expen­
diture (current expenditure less education and defense expenditure) is associated 
with lower per-capita growth. Furthermore, our result cuts against the grain of 
policy advice received by developing countries, which prescribes cutting current, 
rather than capital, expenditures in order to foster long-term growth. In the next 
subsection, we report on various tests of the robustness of these results, which 
show that they are not just a statistical anomaly. In the final section, we offer 
some interpretations of these findings. 
The relationship between the capital component of public expenditure and 
per-capita growth is negative and significant as illustrated in Eq. (1.2).11  Once 
again this belies the standard hypothesis. Public expenditure on capital goods is 
supposed to add to the country's physical capital (mainly infrastructure-roads, 
bridges, dams, ports, power plants, etc.). Intuition suggests that the resulting 
10Hansen and  Hodrick  (1980) introduced  an  econometric  time-series technique  to estimate the 
covariance  matrix  of the  0 LS  estimator  when errors  are  serially  correlated  due  to  the  use  of 
overlapping observations. By sampling more finely than the forest interval (i.e., by using overlapping 
observations) they were able to increase  the size  of the data in examining  the 'efficient-markets 
hypothesis' for foreign exchange markets.  We extend their time-series technique to  estimate  the 
covariance matrix of the OLS estimator when serial correlation is introduced by using overlapping 
observations over time in panel data (see Appendix A). 
1 1The coefficient is not exactly the negative of current expenditure because the latter is net of interest 
payments (so that the two shares do not sum to one).  When the budgetary share of total current 
expenditure (i.e., including interest spending) is used, the coefficient is positive, statistically signifi­
cant, and exactly equal (in absolute value) to the coefficient of current spending. S.  Deuarajan eta/.  1 Journal of  Monetary Economics 37 (1996 ) 313-344  325 
Table 1 
Composition of government expenditure and  economic  growth, with  t-statistics in parentheses 
Dependent  variable= GRPCGDP,  five-year  forward  moving  average  of per  capita  real  GDP 
growth rate 
Eq. (1.1)  Eq. (1.2)  Eq. (1.3)  Eq. (1.4)  Eq. (1.5)  Eq. (1.6) 
East Asia  0.06  4.58  7.29  3.70  6.66  8.21 
(0.03)  (3.50)  (3.72)  (0.82)  (2.74)  (1.32) 
South Asia  0.30  4.65  5.89  2.61  7.46  7.86 
(0.14)  (3.20)  (3.85)  (0.51)  (2.75)  (1.21) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.93  1.75  3.66  0.28  2.93  4.33 
(-1.45)  (1.43)  (2.05)  (0.08)  (1.29)  (0.78) 
Latin America  -3.86  0.75  2.03  6.32  4.28  7.86 
(-1.96)  (0.71)  (1.25)  (1.93)  (2.11)  (1.64) 
EMENA  -0.99  3.38  5.27  4.22  3.91  5.78 
(-0.39)  (1.82)  (2.29)  (1.08)  (1.70)  (1.05) 
Te/GDP  0.016  0.002  -0.033  -0.039 
(0.43)  (0.06)  (-0.86)  (-0.48) 
NcurjTe  0.046 
(1.98) 
Cap/Te  -0.045 
(-1.72) 
Def/Te  -0.053  0.093  -0.053  -0.006 
(-1.38)  (0.96)  (-0.91)  (-0.05) 
Hlth/Te  -0.024  -0.50 
(-0.30)  (-2.15) 
Ed/Te  -0.021  0.017 
(-0.36)  (0.16) 
Tac/Te  -0.145  -0.33  -0.22  -0.30 
(-3.16)  (-5.54)  (-3.71)  (-3.41) 
Schl/Te  0.075  0.02 
(0.65)  (0.07) 
UnivjTe  0.38  0.39 
(1.18)  (0.85) 
Othed!Te  0.63  -0.56 
(2.64)  (- 1.02) 
Hosp/Te  0.29  -0.70 
(0.52)  (-2.00) 
Inhlth!Te  0.02  0.02 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Eq. (1.1)  Eq. (1.2)  Eq. (1.3)  Eq. (1.4)  Eq. (1.5)  Eq. (1.6) 
Othlth/Te  1.03  1.05 
(1.17)  (1.19) 
HlthCap  -0.16 
(  - 1.89) 
Ed  Cap  -0.025 
(-1.45) 
Black  -0.013  -0.014  -0.010  0.003  -0.010  -0.009 
(- 2.50)  (- 2.59)  (-1.96)  (0.09)  (-1.11)  (-0.31) 
Shock  -0.05  -0.053  0.008  0.005  -0.01  -0.051 
(- 0.75)  (- 0.90)  (0.14)  (0.03)  (-0.10)  (- 0.27) 
Adj. R-sq.  0.33  0.30  0.37  0.81  0.53  0.79 
Obs.  294  305  266  54  121  54 
ow  0.56  0.55  0.66  0.92  0.84  0.83 
stock of infrastructure capital would complement private-sector productivity 
and, hence, have favorable growth effects. 
The level effect of total government expenditure12 on per-capita growth is 
positive but statistically insignificant. This is consistent with our model's predic­
tion: to finance a higher level of government spending higher distortionary taxes 
are needed and the steady-state growth rate will increase only if the productivity 
of that government spending exceeds the deadweight loss associated with the 
taxes required to pay for it. 
Eq.  (1.3) - which includes expenditure shares according to  the  functional 
classification-indicates that defense and economic infrastructure are negatively 
related to per-capita growth. Public spending in health and education also have 
negative  coefficients though  they  are  statistically insignificant.  As  economic 
infrastructure expenditures in general have a high proportion of capital expendi­
tures, the finding that it has a negative correlation with per-capita real GDP 
growth is consistent with the negative correlation found between capital expen­
ditures  and  per-capita  growth  in  Eq.  (1.2).  The  result  is, however,  in  sharp 
contrast with the finding of Easterly and Rebelo (1993, p. 431), who report that 
public investments  in transport  and  communication  in developing  countries 
'seem to be  consistently  positively  correlated  with growth with a  very high 
12This variable in the regression controls for the level effect of public expenditure as we are primarily 
interested in examining the  link  between  the  composition of public  expenditure  and  economic 
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coefficient'.13 There are at least two reasons why our finding is different from 
that of Easterly and Rebelo: First, consistent with our theoretical model, our 
result is on the composition effect of spending on growth; the level effect has been 
controlled for separately in the regression analysis by the variable TE/GDP (the 
share of total expenditure in  GOP).  In other words, a unit increase in  the 
budgetary share of transport and communication spending has to be matched 
by a unit decrease in some other spending share(s), as the size of total spending 
remains fixed.  On  the other hand,  Easterly and  Rebelo find a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on the share of transport and communication 
spending in GOP - a variable that mixes the level effect of spending with the 
composition effect. In their analysis, a unit increase in the share of transport and 
communication spending in GOP does not necessarily mean that other expendi­
ture items-which could enhance the productivity of transport and communica­
tion spending-are decreasing. Second, Easterly and Rebelo use a new measure 
of public investment-one which incorporates public investment by all levels of 
government  as well as investments  by public enterprises - in transport  and 
communication  in  developing  countries.  While  we  agree  that  such  a  con­
solidated public investment series is needed to examine the full impact of public 
expenditures and growth (the expenditure data used in our research are confined 
to  the  central  government),  the  authors  construct  this  series  from  a  large 
collection of World Bank reports on public investment in individual developing 
countries.  Unfortunately, such reports do not present data consistently.  For 
instance, in one country report 'development expenditures' refers exclusively to 
capital expenditures while in others it contains some current expenditures as 
well. We are therefore skeptical that meaningful results can be obtained from 
data constructed in this manner. 
In Eq. (1.4), public spending on health care is disaggregated into expenditure 
on  (i)  hospital affairs and services  [Hasp],  (ii)  clinics providing mainly out­
patient services  [Inhlth], and (iii)  public health affairs and services (mainly of 
a preventive nature), applied research, and experimental development related to 
the health and medical delivery system [Othlth]. Notwithstanding the reduced 
number of observations with this specification of the health expenditure vari­
able, we find that the coefficient of the share of expenditure on public health 
affairs and services, etc. [Othlth] is weakly positive for per-capita growth. The 
other two  components of health  expenditures have statistically insignificant 
coefficients.  A  unit increase  in  per-capita  health  expenditure  [HlthCap]  is 
however associated  with  a  decline in per-capita  growth.  Thus, the  finding 
indicates that neither health expenditure  per  capita nor total public health 
expenditure as a share of total expenditure is positively related to the per-capita 
growth rate. It is the share of health expenditure on preventive care and research 
and development that has some growth effects. 
13This is the only sectoral public spending variable that is statistically significant in their analysis. 328  S.  Deuarajan et a!. / Journal of Monetary Ecunumic� 3 7 (/ 996) 313-344 
In  Eq.  (1.5}, we  disaggregate the education  variable  into  expenditure  on 
(i) administration, management, inspection, operation of pre-primary, primary, 
and secondary education [Schl], (ii) of tertiary education [U  niv  ], and (iii) other 
education [Othed]. As reported in Eq. (1.5), this last component of education 
expenditure is positively and significantly related to the per-capita growth rate. 
This category of spending on education includes subsidiary services to educa­
tion (transportation, food, lodging, medical, and other such services to students}, 
program units engaged in administering, supporting, or carrying out applied 
research into teaching methods and objectives, into learning theory and curricu­
lum development, etc. A unit increase in the share of this category of education 
spending leads to an increase of 0.63 percentage points in per-capita real GDP. 
The  level  of  education  expenditure  (measured  by per-capita  real  education 
expenditure, Edcap) has negative growth effects. 
As  for  the  other  variables in the regressions, note that the black-market 
premium is negative and statistically significant in almost all the equations. The 
sign is what would be expected: the higher the premium, the more distorted the 
economy, the worse its growth performance. Interestingly, the shock variable is 
not statistically significant. It is possible that most of the contribution of this 
variable is being picked up by the regional dummies, which are, for the most 
part, statistically significant. 
3.3.  Alternative specifications and samples 
Given the surprising nature of these results, especially those having to do with 
current and capital expenditures, we now subject them to a series of tests, to 
ensure that they are not due to some statistical fluke. The tests are not formal 
ones. Rather, they are based on our views of possible factors which could be 
driving these results but were not connected with the productivity of public 
spending. 
3.3.1.  Developed vs.  developing countries sample 
Our use of panel data also distinguishes our study from Barra's (1991), which 
is based on cross-country regressions. It is worth investigating whether this 
difference, or some other variation between the two approaches, is responsible 
for the sharp contrast in results. To begin with Barra's study combines both 
developed and developing countries, whereas our sample is restricted to devel­
oping countries only. This appears to be important. Rerunning our regressions 
with a sample of 21 developed countries/4 we find that our conclusions are 
reversed and the results conform to the standard hypothesis: The coefficient for 
14All OECD countries except Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, which are not part of the 'high-income 
economies' as defined in World Bank (1994). S. Devarajan et al.  /Journal of Monetary Economics 37 (1996) 313-344  329 
Table 2 
Composition of government expenditure and economic growth,  for  developed  countries,  with  t-
statistics in parentheses 
Dependent variable= GRPCGDP, five-year moving average per capita real GOP growth rate 
Eq.  (2.1)  Eq. (2.2)  Eq. (2.3)  Eq. (2.4)  Eq. (2.5)  Eq. (2.6) 
Intercept  8.55  1.12  1.18  1.35  0.77  0.97 
(6.21)  (3.53)  (2.34)  (2.59)  (1.3)  (1.41) 
TejGDP  0.01  0.01  0.015  0.023  0.019  0.025 
(1.37)  (1.38)  (1.79)  (2.39)  (1.66)  (2.12) 
Cur/Te  -0.074 
(-4.72) 
CapjTe  0.072 
(4.57) 
Def!Te  -0.024  -0.024  0.005  -0.007 
(-1.36)  (-1.24)  (0.26)  (-0.33) 
HlthjTe  0.019  0.048 
(1.48)  (3.12) 
EdjTe  -0.029  -0.071 
(-1.45)  (-2.72) 
TacjTe  0.089  0.09  0.002  0.036 
(3.50)  (3.02)  (0.05)  (1.02) 
Schl;Te  -0.03  -0.07 
(-1.03)  (-2.12) 
Univ/Te  -0.17  -0.14 
(-2.47)  (- 1.88) 
Othed/Te  0.41  0.24 
(3.52)  (1.93) 
Hosp/Te  0.036  0.056 
(2.13)  (3.11) 
Inhlth/Te  -0.081  -0.035 
(-3.34)  (  -1.20) 
Othlth/Te  0.10  0.11 
(2.53)  (2.68) 
Adj. R-sq.  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.18  0.14  0.21 
Obs.  319  319  285  199  211  194 
ow  0.46  0.45  0.52  0.58  0.49  0.59 
capital expenditure is positive and statistically significant; and the coefficient for 
current expenditure is negative and statistically significant. 
Table 2  has the estimates of  Eq. (13)  for the  21  developed countries; the 
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regression specification. There is no black market for foreign exchange in these 
countries; and economic growth in developed economies is not affected by the 
kind of country-specific exogenous shocks captured by our shock variable. To 
make these  results  exactly comparable to Barra's, we would have to redefine 
current expenditure by subtracting total expenditures on education and defense. 
This is problematic, since current expenditure is part of the economic classifica­
tion of public expenditure, whereas education and defense fall under the func­
tional category. In other words, to recreate Barra's variables with our data, we 
would have to subtract apples from oranges. Nevertheless, the reversal of our 
results for developed countries is interesting in its own right. While the popular 
view is that developing countries lack infrastructure and other types of public 
capital, and that developed countries do  not, there are several reasons why 
public capital expenditure could be more productive in developed countries. 
First, the optimal level of public goods in an economy is a function of the other 
distortions  in  the  economy  (see  Hulten, 1994).  If  distortions  in  developing 
countries  are  such  that  the  desired  level  of  public  goods  is  smaller,  then 
additional expenditure on these  public  goods may  in  fact  be  unproductive. 
Second, as shown in our theoretical model, an increase in the share going to 
expenditures which are traditionally considered productive need not raise the 
growth rate: the initial shares could be such that there is already 'too much' of 
this kind of expenditure so an increase is counterproductive. 
Finally, we investigate whether the difference between using cross-section and 
panel data is important. If we collapse our panel data set so that we have only 
one observation per country (taking period averages), our results do change. 
While the coefficients on current and capital expenditure do not change in signs, 
they are no longer statistically significant. However, if we lag the period averages 
(for example, let average public expenditure shares from 1970-1985 affect the 
average growth rate from 1975-1990), the results begin resembling our earlier 
ones in Table 1. Thus, allowing for a time lag in the effect of public expenditure 
on growth - not an unreasonable notion, given the gestation periods of most 
public projects - has a strong effect on the signs of the coefficients, and could 
very well be the  reason our results differ from  Barra's. As noted above, the 
five-year forward lag structure in our model addresses partially the problem of 
joint endogeneity. It is possible that the opposite results such as Barra's are due 
to reverse causality in his model. 
3.3.2.  Fixed-effects model 
The regression results reported in Section 3.2 are based on panel data with the 
implicit assumption that there are  no  individual cross-sectional effects.  It is 
likely, however, that  there  are  country-specific  characteristics  which  might 
influence per-capita growth. While such characteristics are generally difficult to 
measure (e.g., cultural factors), simply running pooled regression may bias the S.  Devarajan et al.  /Journal uj'Monetary Economics 37 (1996)  313-344  331 
coefficient estimates. We apply the  fixed-effects method which takes into ac­
count country-specific characteristics and models them as fixed effects within the 
country. In such a case we estimate the following individual-mean corrected 
regression model: 
GRPCGDP;+ 1. t+5  =  :Xj  + {Jk XL+ ,u;' 
where the variable X consists of all the independent variables of Eq. (13). The 
computational procedure (see  Hsiao, 1992) for estimating the parameters re­
quires transforming the observed variables by subtracting out the appropriate 
time-series means, and then applying the least-squares method to the trans­
formed data. 
Table 3 contains the estimates of the above equation. The issue of interest is: 
How do the results presented in Table 1 change with the fixed-effects method? 
Eq. (3.1) in Table 3 shows that the coefficient on the budgetary share of current 
expenditure (net of  interest) continues to be weakly positive and statistically 
significant. Similarly, the coefficient on capital expenditure's share is negative 
and statistically significant. The most significant change is the statistical signifi­
cance of the coefficient on the share of transport and communication. In all but 
one  of  four specifications, the negative  relationship between transport  and 
communications and per-capita growth is statistically insignificant. One reason 
for this could be the loss in degrees of freedom in going from continent dummies 
to the  fixed-effects approach.  Another interesting feature of this  fixed-effects 
model  is  that  the  shock  variable,  which  was  previously  insignificant,  now 
becomes highly significant, and the black-market premium does the reverse. 
Evidently, the black-market premium was picking up country-specific charac­
teristics  (political  instability, etc.).  Once  these  characteristics  were  explicitly 
accounted for, the premium loses significance. By contrast, the external shock 
variable's role appears to have strengthened, since it now captures those deter­
minants of growth not incorporated in the country-specific characteristics. 
3.3.3.  Nonlinear specification and other variables 
In this subsection we discuss the regression results based on other specifica­
tions of the basic model reported in Eq. (13). In the first instance we attempt 
a nonlinear specification of the model. Both theory and intuition suggest that 
expenditure ratios and growth might have a nonlinear relationship. From the 
model in Section 2 we know that productive expenditures can be positively 
associated  with  growth  when  their  shares  in the  budget  are  low  but  this 
relationship turns negative when the share gets large. The intuition is that as the 
share keeps rising, decreasing returns to scale set in and, eventually, the relation­
ship between the two variables turns negative. 
Table 4 reports the nonlinear regression model. In Eq. (4.1), the growth rate is 
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Table 3 
Composition of government  expenditure  and  economic growth, for  fixed-effects  model,  with  t-
statistics in parentheses 
Dependent  variable = GRPCGDP,  five-year  forward  moving  average  of  per  capita  real  GDP 
growth  rate 
Eq. (3.1)  Eq. (3.2)  Eq. (3.3)  Eq. (3.4)  Eq. (3.5)  Eq. (3.6) 
Intercept  0.041  0.1  0.048  -0.11  -0.023  -0 .15 
(0.42)  (1.04)  (0.46)  (-0.43)  (-0.14)  (-0.46) 
TeiGDP  0.002  -0.003  - 0.015  0.035 
(0.07)  (-0.13)  (-0.47)  (0.3) 
Ncur/Te  0.035 
(2.7) 
CapiTe  -0.059 
(-3.41) 
De jjTe  0.053  -0 .13  0.016  -0 .11 
(1.42)  (-1.23)  (0.27)  (-0.97) 
HlthiTe  -0.0 13  0.14 
(-0.30)  (0.62) 
EdjTe  0.006  -0 .16 
(0.14)  (-l.l1) 
TacjTe  -0.037  -0.14  -0 .04  -0 .13 
(-1.14)  ( - 1.24)  (-0.88)  (-1. 00) 
SchliTe  0.16  -0.29 
(1.40)  (-1.37) 
UniviTe  0.09  0.23 
(0.45)  (0.58) 
Othed/Te  0.16  -0.14 
(0.81)  (-0.24) 
Hosp/Te  0.75  0.46 
(0.90)  (0.48) 
Inhlth/Te  0.43  0.21 
(0.70)  (0.26) 
Othlth/Te  2.26  2.14 
(2.48)  (2.06) 
HlthCap  -0 .39 
(-3.24) 
Ed  Cap  -0.091 
(-3.88) 
Black  0.0004  0.0005  0.001  -0.009  0.001  -0 .009 
(0.44)  (0.61)  (1. 00)  (-0.36)  (0.18)  (-0.33) S.  Devarajan et al.  /Journal of  Monetary Economics 37 (1996 ) 313-344  333 
Table 3 (continued) 
Eq. (3.1)  Eq. (3.2)  Eq. (3.3)  Eq. (3.4)  Eq. (3.5)  Eq. (3.6) 
Shock  -0.096  -0.095  -0.12  0.017  -0.096  -0.065 
(-3.67)  (-3.67)  (-3.86)  (0.16)  (- 1.78)  (- 0.50) 
Adj. R-sq.  0.06  0.08  0.05  0.26  0.15  0.06 
Obs.  294  305  266  54  121  54 
DW  0.96  1.05  1.04  0.84  1.03  1.01 
Table 4 
Composition of government expenditure and  economic  growth, for  nonlinear  specification,  with 
/-statistics in parentheses 
Dependent  variable  =  GRPCGDP,  five-year  forward  moving  average  of  per  capita  real  GDP 
growth rate 
Eq. (4.1)  Eq. (4.2) 
East Asia  -6.41  2.76 
(1.83)  (2.87) 
South Asia  -6.18  2.88 
(-1.76)  (2.87) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -9.37  0.04 
(- 2.69)  (0.05) 
Latin America  -10.26  -1.06 
(-2.96)  (-1.2) 
EM  ENA  -7.55  1.35 
(-2.09)  (1.09) 
Te/GDP  0.02  0.008 
(0.97)  (0.41) 
Ncur/Te  0.24 
(2.39) 
(Ncur/Te)sq.  -0.001 
(-1.95) 
Cap/Te  0.11 
(1.80) 
(Cap/Te)sq.  -0.003 
(-2.62) 
Black  -0.013  -0.014 
(  -4.0)  (-4.58) 
Shock  -0.048  -0.059 
(-1.37)  (-1.7) 
Adj. R-sq.  0.33  0.32 
Obs.  294  305 
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spending) in the budget and a decreasing function of the square term. While the 
first variable is strongly significant (t-value  =  2.39), the square term is insignifi­
cant at the conventional 5 percent level. There is one clear explanation of this 
result: Most of the data points are clustered around the positive and upward­
sloping part of the functional relationship. Therefore, it is likely that the linear 
relationship gives a better fit. The nonlinear specification for the capital expendi­
ture ratio is reported in Eq. (4.2). The function attains a maximum when the 
ratio is around  18 percent. While the coefficient on the square term is statis­
tically significant, the coefficient on the other variable is not. Once again these 
results corroborate our earlier findings reported in Table  1. In this case most of 
the  data  points cluster around the  downward sloping negative part  of  the 
functional relationship. 
As a check on our results we also include each country's per-capita GDP in 
1969 as a proxy for the initial level of development for that country. Previous 
students of the growth process (e.g., Chenery and Syrquin, 1975) have found this 
variable to be an important factor in determining the relationship between, say, 
openness and growth. When this variable is included, the results reported in 
Table  1  remain  unchanged.  The  variable  itself  has  a  negative  sign  and  is 
statistically insignificant.  However, the variable becomes significant when we 
drop the continent dummies although, again there is no change in the other 
coefficients. 15 
3.3.4.  General vs.  central government spending 
Our data set covers the operations of only the central government. Ideally, 
one would like to examine the impact of total government expenditures that 
includes the operations of state and local governments as well as expenditures of 
government-owned or -controlled enterprises, on economic growth. This may 
be particularly important in the  case of health and education expenditures; 
where in some federal systems, the bulk of these expenditures are carried out 
by subnational governments. Such  comprehensive and  consistent expenditure 
series  (across  countries  and  over  time)  are  not  available.  However,  there 
are a few countries for which consolidated general government expenditures 
(i.e., operations of  central, state, and local governments) are reported in the 
GFS. 
In order to determine whether or not including state and local government 
expenditure data qualitatively and quantitatively affects our results, we do a few 
diagnostic tests. Of the 43 countries in our sample, there are nine (see Appendix 
B for the list) for which consolidated general government expenditure data are 
reported in the GFS. We use this sample of nine countries to ascertain whether 
15For space considerations these results are not reported here. They are available from the authors. S.  Devarajan et al. /J ournal of  Monetary Economics 37  (1996 ) 313-344  335 
Table 5 
Sample statistics for central and general government expenditure shares, for nine countries, 1971-90 
Observations  Mean  Std. deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
cc  CG  cc  CG  cc  CG  cc  CG  cc  CG 
Cur/Te  184  !35  79.46  76.99  12.64  14.16  98.05  97.73  47.15  45.44 
NcurjTe  184  135  70.70  68.85  12.90  14.28  91.86  93.07  35.12  32.11 
CapjTe  184  135  20.55  20.97  12.62  12.09  52.85  51.95  1.95  1.95 
Def/ Te  145  121  11.95  8.67  5.70  5.93  26.24  20.76  1.69  0.01 
Hlth/Te  182  126  6.17  6.62  3.73  3.79  19.83  19.44  1.09  2.01 
EdujTe  182  126  11.82  13.43  5.94  3.53  24.00  24.31  1.46  6.52 
TacjTe  179  125  8.63  8.85  6.40  6.02  48.27  27.99  0.90  1.96 
The nine countries are:  Argentina, Chile, Ethiopia,  Indonesia,  India, Kenya,  Malawi,  Panama, 
Zimbabwe. 
CC = consolidated central government and CG =  consolidated general government. 
the expenditure ratios used in our analysis are statistically different for general 
government from central government in these countries. 
Table 5 presents the sample statistics for the expenditure ratios. In comparing 
the statistics for the two different levels of government, a couple of interesting 
facts emerge: as defense is primarily the responsibility of the central government, 
the ratio of defense to total expenditure decreases for general government; the 
share of education expenditure is larger for general government indicating that 
state and local government allocate a higher budgetary share for education. The 
expenditure ratios presented in Table 5 also seem to indicate that state and local 
governments spend more money on  capital but less on current expenditure. 
Based on a paired t-test, we find that all expenditure ratios but transport and 
communication based on general government data are statistically different 
(significant at the  99%  level) from the  ratios  based  on central  government 
data.16 
To test whether or not the relationship between the composition of expendi­
ture and economic growth is different when expenditure shares based on general 
government data are used, we run the same regression model based on each of 
the two data sets. The regression results are reported in Table 6. 
While the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are similar for both data 
sets,  the  coefficients are  statistically  insignificant.  A  paired  t-test, however, 
indicates that the difference between the coefficients is statistically insignificant. 
Hence, the  coefficient  estimates  of the  growth  equations  based  on  general 
government expenditure and central government expenditure are statistically 
the same. 
16For space considerations these results are not reported here. They are available from the authors. Table 6 
Composition of government expenditure and economic growth,  with  t-statistics in parentheses 
Dependent variable  =  GRPCGDP, five-year moving average per capita real GDP growth rate 
Eq. (C.l)  Eq. (G.l)  t-test  Eq. (C.2)  Eq. (G.2)  t-test 
East Asia  4.53  4.88  0.023  1.17  2.09  -0.286 
(2.25)  (2.52)  (0.53)  (0.88) 
South Asia  4.92  5.14  0.086  2.54  2.48  0.035 
(2.04)  (1.97)  (2.36)  (1.67) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.92  2.52  0.11  0.28  -0.06  0.132 
(0.98)  (0.75)  (0.16)  (-0.03) 
Latin America  4.68  4.65  0.072  2.25  1.92  0.119 
(1.47  (1.35)  (1.18)  (0.97) 
EM  ENA  0  0  0  0  0  0 
TejGDP  -0 .025  -0 .026  -0 .048  -0 .023  -0 .02  -0 .036 
(-0.41)  (-0.44)  (-0.39)  (-0.35) 
NucrjTe  -0 .024  -0 .027  0.065 
( - 0.91)  (-0.98) 
Eq. (CJ)  Eq. (G.3) 
- 1.62  1.41 
(-0.54)  (0.68) 
1.695  0.84 
(0.88)  (0.48) 
-6 .41  -3 .60 
(-1.46)  (-1.37) 
-2 .78  -2 .01 
(-0.83)  (-0.75) 
0  0 
-0 .011  -0 .012 

















































0.043  0.033  0.215 
(1.35)  (0.92) 
Def/Te  0.016  -0.086  0.89 
(0.194)  (-1.11) 
Hlth/Te  0.066  0.149  -0.32 
(0.336)  (0.91) 
Ed/Te  0.223  0.152  0.35 
(1.35)  (1.33) 
Tac/Te  0.175  0.062  1.15 
(2.17)  (1.14) 
Black  -0 .014  -0.012  0.127  -0.015  -0.015  0.0  -0.0079  -0.00008  -0.345 
(-1.45)  (-0.91)  (-1.56)  ( - 1.19)  (  -0.441)  (-0.005) 
Shock  -0.03  -0.017  -0.27  -0.046  0.018  -0.505  0.042  0.049  -0.056 
(-0.34)  (-0.18)  (-0.54)  (0.2)  (0.46)  (0.57) 
Adj. R-sq.  0.44  0.47  0.45  0.46  0.52  0.62 
Obs.  60  57  60  57  51  46 
DW  0.96  1.00  0.95  0.97  1.02  1.46 
In the equation numbers C stands for central and G for general  government, and  't-tcst' indicates the t-test for the differences between fJk, and {Jkg" 
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4.  Interpreting the results 
The empirical implementation of the model yielded what at first glance seem 
like surprising results. All of the standard candidates for productive expenditure 
- capital, transport and communication, health, and education - had either 
a negative or insignificant relationship with economic growth. The only broad 
category which was associated with higher economic growth was current expen­
diture. 
But these  results are  not so surprising if we recall the theoretical  model. 
Seemingly productive expenditures may be unproductive if there is an excessive 
amount of them. Our empirical results show that developing-country govern­
ments have been misallocating public expenditures in favor of capital expendi­
tures at the expense of current expenditures, and the developed countries have 
been doing the  reverse.  If,  as  we  suspect, these  results  stand up to  further 
scrutiny, they have important implications for policy. The widespread recom­
mendation to increase public investment's share of the budget in developing 
countries could be misleading. Several components of current expenditure, such 
as operations and maintenance, may have higher rates of return than capital 
ex  pen  di  t  ure. 
This line of inquiry opens up several questions for further research. One is 
whether public expenditures on capital goods enhance public capital stocks 
which have been shown to be associated with economic growth (Canning and 
Fay, 1993; Levine and Renelt, 1992). If not, why not? A second issue is how 
governments choose the level and composition of expenditure. Some govern­
ment objective functions would be consistent with our results; for instance, some 
capital expenditures ('white elephants') could be in the governments objective 
function. What then do our results say about government behavior in develop­
ing countries? These open questions notwithstanding, the basic message arising 
from this paper is that the traditional view of the link between the composition 
of public expenditures and economic growth is not borne out by the historical 
experience of developing countries. 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper investigated the relationship between the composition of pubic 
expenditure and economic growth. Using a simple, analytical model, we derived 
conditions under which a change in the mix of public spending could lead to 
a higher steady-state growth rate for the economy. The conditions depended not 
just on the physical productivity of different components of public spending but 
also on the shares of government expenditure allocated to them. Based on the 
model,  our  empirical  results  suggest  that  expenditures  which  are  normally 
considered  productive  could  become  unproductive  if  there  is  an  excessive S.  Devarajan et al.  ! Journal of  Monetary Economics 37 (1996 ) 313-344  339 
amount of them. In particular, capital expenditures - often thought to be the 
mainstay of development - may have been excessive in developing countries, 
rendering them unproductive  at  the  margin.  Because  they  are  squeezed  by 
capital spending, current expenditures are actually productive at the margin. 
These results  confirm  that developing-country  governments  have  been  mis­
allocating resources, but show that the direction of bias is quite different from 
the standard view. 
Appendix A 
Overlapping  observations  and  serial  correlation:  Estimation of  the  covariance 
matrix of  the OLS estimator 




E(/1� 11f +h) = 0 
for all countries i, 
for  h =I 0, 
for  i 
= j, h = 0. 
Proposition.  If 
is the regression equation to be estimated by the standard OLS technique where 
the  dependent variable  is a  k-year forward moving  average, then  under  the 
Gauss -Markov assumptions the error structure satisfies the following: 
E(/l;,k !l{+h,k) 
= 0  for  i =lj, 
= 0  for  h ;:::: k, 
=1 0  for  i  = j,  h < k. 
Proof  We will prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose that all the 
standard Gauss -Markov assumptions are satisfied. Therefore: 
i 
=j,  h < k. 
The above assumption implies 
Let 
E[  { Yc�+  1 . t+k) - px;}{  Yc�+h+  1 , t+h+k) - px;+h}J 
=  o,  h < k. 
Y(t+ 1,  t+kJ 
=  Y,,k  and  Y(t+h+  1, t+h+kJ =  Y,+h, k· 340  S. Devarajan et al.  /J ournal of  Monetary Economics 37 (19 96 ) 313-344 
Then 
or 
E(Y/.k Y/+h,k) - {JX; E(Y/+h,k) - {JX;+h  E(Y/k) 
+ {Jx; {Jx:+h 
=  o, 
E(Y,� k Y/+h,k) - E(Y,:k)E(Y/+h,k)- E(Y/+h,k)E(Y,: k) 
+  E(Y/k)E(Y /+h,k) 
=  0 
Further, this can be written as 
E(Y/,k Y/+h,k) = E(Y,�k)E(Y/+h,k), 
h < k, 
h < k. 
h < k. 
But this means that  Y,: k and  Y/+h. k for h < k are uncorrelated. This is a contra­
diction because the dependent variable being a k-year forward moving average 
implies Y/ k and Y/+h, k are correlated for h < k. Hence, it must be the case that 
i 
=j,  h < k.  Q.E.D. 
We have shown that, by using overlapping observations in panel data, serial 
correlation over time is introduced in the error structure in the simple  OLS 
regression analysis. The errors are correlated as long as the sampling interval is 
less than the moving average lag. Given this correlation, the OLS procedure 
yields consistent estimates but the standard errors needed to apply tests of 
significance are incorrect. 
To correct the standard errors of the least-squares estimators, we use a meth­
odology first proposed by Hansen and Hodrick (1980) in examining restrictions 
on a  k-step ahead forecasting equation. We extend the applicability of their 
technique from time-series to panel data (pooled cross-section/time-series data). 
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) note that in testing hypotheses concerning the 
parameters of a k-step ahead linear forecasting equation 
one  way  to ensure that the errors are  serially uncorrelated is to define  the 
sampling interval to be equal to the forecast interval. In the context of tests of 
exchange market efficiency, however, this procedure of using nonoverlapping 
observations to avoid serial correlation, does not make use of all available data. 
In testing the efficient-markets hypothesis for foreign exchange markets, Hansen 
and  Hodrick use data sampled more  finely than the forecast interval. They 
propose  a  modified  OLS  technique  which  allows  the  estimation  of  the 
covariance matrix of the OLS estimator. 
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) show that ft (Pr - {3) converges in distribution 
to a normally distributed random vector with mean zero and covariance matrix S.  Devara jan et a/. /J ournal of  Monetary Economics 37 (1996 ) 313-344  341 
e, where  T is the sample size, PT is the OLS estimator, 
and 
k-1 
e  = Rx(O) - 1 SRx(O)- 1  and  �  - I  Ru(j)Rx(j), 
j=  -k+ 1 
Rx(j) = E(x; x,+j)  and  Ru(j) = E(u,,ku t+j,k). 
Further, they show that 
�T  .  1  T 
I  �T  1  �  AT  AT  Rx (J) = - I  x, x,-j  and  Ru (j) = -
T 
�  u,, k u,-j, k 
T r=j+ 1  t=j+1 
are consistent estimators of  Rx(j) and Ru(j), respectively. Thus, by estimating 
the covariance matrix they compute asymptotically justified confidence regions 
of the OLS estimator. 
Using  panel  data  we  extend  their  analysis  by  noting  that  for  country 
i = 1,  ...  ,N  with observations t  =  1, ...  , T 
E(y;+k) = x;f3. 
Thus, along the lines of the Hansen-Hodrick methodology 
is a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of the OLS estimator, PN.T; 
XN.J' is a column vector formed by stacking the N*T observations on x,; and 
Q is a symmetric N*T x N*T matrix whose lower triangular representation is 
where 
at+n,t = R)i(O), 
= R﻽'(n), 
n = 0,  t =  1, ...  , N*T, 
n=1, ... ,k-l ,  ti=A. T-j+1 , 
where A. = 1,  ... , N-1,  j = 1, ...  , n, 
= 0,  otherwise, 
�  1  N  T 
Ai  Ai  R)i (j)  = 
-- I  I  J.lt, k J.lt-j, k·  N*T i=1 r=j+ 1 
In extending the applicability of the Hansen-Hodrick technique to panel data 
one significant change is introduced in the structure of the covariance matrix. 
This is due to the following assumption: 
i i= j,  for any h and k. 
The implication is that by using overlapping observations for a country in panel 
data, serial correlation is introduced over time but not across country. 342  S.  Devarajan  et al. j Journal of  Monetary Economics 37 (1996)  313-344 
Appendix B 
Data 
Annual data on 43 developing countries (see the list below) from 1970 through 
1990 were used for the empirical analysis. Several sources were used (see below 
the section on sources) to assemble the data base. At this point, we are still in the 
process of collecting additional data. 
The  primary  source  for  data  on  government  expenditure  is  Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS), an annual publication of the International Monetary 
Fund. Ideally, we would like to have consolidated general government (includ­
ing the expenditures of public-sector enterprises) expenditure data to examine 
the full impact of public expenditures on economic growth. Unfortunately, such 
data do not exist in sufficient quantity for the majority of developing countries. 
GFS coverage is comprehensive for central government accounts but is quite 
restricted for the accounts of general government. For this reason, the main 
empirical results presented in data used in this  paper are  based on central 
government expenditures. The operations of state and local governments as well 
as expenditures of government owned or controlled public-sector enterprises are 
not accounted for. Regression results based on consolidated general government 
(includes central, provincial and municipal) expenditures are presented in Table 
6. Within the main sample of 43 countries, expenditure data on 34 countries are 
on consolidated  central government  (includes  central  government  account, 
social  security,  and  extra  budgetary  account),  and  on  the  remaining  nine 
countries, it only accounts for budgetary central government. 
B. I.  Data sources 
(i)  Government  Finance  Statistics  (GFS),  International  Finance  Statistics 
(IFS), and National Accounts (BESD - World Bank Economic and Social 
Database)- all from the International Monetary Fund. 
(ii)  International Currency Analysis,  Inc.,  World  Currency  Yearbook, New 
York. 
(iii)  IECNA in BESD; World Development Report (WDR), 1991; World Debt 
Tables (WDT) - all from the World Bank. 
B.2.  Countries 
Country groups: Regional classification 
5 East Asia countries, 3 South Asia countries, 18 sub-Saharan Africa coun­
tries, 13  Latin American and Caribbean countries, and 4 Europe, Middle East, 
and North Africa (EMENA) countries. S.  Devarajan et a/.  /J ournal of  Monetary Economics 37  (1996) 313-344  343 
Country groups: Income levels 
19 Low-income  countries,  22  middle-income  (lower-level)  countries,  and 
2 middle-income (upper-level) countries. 
Country list 
Argentina*,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Burkina  Faso,  Cameroon,  Chile*,  Colombia, 
Costa  Rica,  Egypt,  Arab  Republic  of,  El  Salvador,  Ethiopia*, Guatemala, 
India*, Indonesia*, Kenya*, Korea, Republic of Liberia, Malawi*, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama*, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe*  (the asterisks indicate countries  for  which general  government 
expenditure is also available in the GFS). 
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